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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AERIAL
HIJACKING: AN OVERVIEW
IAN

E. MCPHERSON*

LTHOUGH THIS PART of the symposium has been entitled "Recent

Developments in Aerial Hijacking," I feel that it might be useful
if we had a brief refresher on the development of the international law
relating to this subject. In any event, I am afraid that we must admit
that anything within the last ten years or so, in law, is recent. This is
particularly so with respect to the development of international law.
The first multilateral public international law treaty directed
specifically towards the legal suppression of acts of violence affecting civil
aviation was not concluded until 1963, and I refer here to the Tokyo
Convention.1 It was quite apparent for many years prior thereto to those

interested in the subject, that the international law, and in many instances
the domestic law, was badly wanting in this respect. As far back as
1931, a group of armed soldiers in Peru captured a Panagra airliner
which they planned to use for dropping propaganda leaflets, and in many
other countries where aviation had assumed significant proportions
incidents of this nature are recorded. As a generality it is safe to say that
when crimes were committed on aircraft overflying and landing in a
country, particularly if the aircraft was registered in that country, the
question of jurisdiction and with it the question of punishment of
the offender did not pose a great problem. However, with the post-war
rapid development of international commercial flying, the question of
criminal jurisdiction and related problems assumed practical as well as
academic significance. A well known case occurred in 1948 where one
Cordova committed an assault on board an aircraft registered in the
United States flying between Puerto Rico and New York. In the ensuing
trial, 2 it was held that the United States had no jurisdiction to punish
the perpetrator of the assault committed on an aircraft in flight over the
high seas. As I understand it, it was as a direct result of this particular
incident that your Congress passed the Act relating to Crimes In Flight
Over the High Seas. 3 Similar lacunas in criminal law jurisdiction were
* B.A., L.L.B., University of British Columbia; L.L.M., McGill University. Mr.
McPherson is the Past Treasurer of the Canadian Branch of the International Law
Association; former Chairman of the Legal Committee of IATA; and has been a
member of the Canadian delegation to a number of international air law conferences.
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120 U.S.T. 2941; T.I.A.S. 6768 [hereinafter cited as The Tokyo Convention, Art..
2 United States v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (ED.N.Y. 1952).
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encountered in other parts of the world. In Canada, we only remedied
this in 1959 when we extended the jurisdiction of our Criminal Code to
cover Canadian aircraft registered wherever they were flying and any
aircraft if they first landed in Canada after the offense had been
committed.4 Although amendments to national legislation did much to
eliminate the possibility of crimes committed on aircraft going unpunished,
it was recognized in international legal circles that the matter of
jurisdiction could only be satisfactorily resolved by an international treaty.
As you know, the International Civil Aviation Organization, 5 which
sits in Montreal, was established by the Convention On International Civil
Aviation (Chicago Convention), 6 signed in December, 1944, and is the
body entrusted by over one hundred Contracting States to develop
methods to ensure, amongst other things, the safe and orderly growth of
international civil aviation throughout the world. The Legal Committee
of ICAO has been the main instrument in developing the international
law required to effect this object. It was the work of this Committee
that culminated in the diplomatic conferences that agreed upon the three
Conventions to which I am now going to refer.
The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft was open for signature at Tokyo on September 14, 1963.7
The Convention was intended primarily to ensure that when an offense
had been committed on board an aircraft, at least one State, the State of
registration of the aircraft, would be able to take jurisdiction over
the suspected offender. 8 The Convention also authorized the aircraft
commander and others on board to take certain action with respect to
the offender to preserve the safety of the aircraft 9 and it placed
obligations on Contracting States with respect to the offender when put
in their custody.10 The Tokyo Convention does not define offenses and the
only section directly relating to hijacking is Article 11 thereof which
reads as follows:
1. When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or
threat thereof an act of interference, seizure or other wrongful
exercise of control of an aircraft in flight or when such an
act is about to be committed, Contracting States shall take all
appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its
lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.

4

1970 Rev. Stat. Canada Chap. Crim.-34 as amended by 1972 Stat. Canada. Chap. 13.

5 Hereinafter cited as ICAO.

661 Stat. 1180; T.I.A.S. 1591; 51 U.N.T.S. 295.
Tokyo Convention.
81d. Art. 3.
7 The

91d. Art. 6.

1OId. Art. 13.
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In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph,
Contracting State in which the aircraft lands shall permit
passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon
practicable, and shall return the aircraft and its cargo to
persons lawfully entitled to its possession.

the
its
as
the

I was fortunate enough to be on the Canadian delegation at Tokyo
and my recollection is that Article 11 was introduced during the
Conference by the United States of America, and its acceptance
encountered considerable opposition as a number of delegates considered
that it was politically motivated and, notwithstanding the experience
elsewhere in the world, was primarily directed towards Cuba. Although
the Convention did not come into force until 1969 the principle
established in Article 11 has been followed in subsequent Conventions
directed to the suppression of unlawful acts endangering international
flight. As we all know now, the United States delegation, I think,
perhaps should be recognized as having been clairvoyant rather than
politically motivated.
With hijackings and other forms of violence directed towards air
operations becoming epidemic in the last decade, the Legal Committee
of ICAO began drafting international law directed more specifically
towards offenses, and on December 16, 1970, there was opened for
signature at the Hague in the Netherlands the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft," i.e., hijacking. This
Convention established hijacking as an offense although it does not use
the term and it applies only to actions on board aircraft. 12 The Convention
requires Contracting States to make the offense punishable by "severe
penalties,"' 13 to take the hijacker into custody and to notify his national
State and the State of registration of the aircraft.' 4 Further, the offense is
deemed to be an extraditable offense' 5 and if the Contracting State in the
territory of which the offender is found does not extradite him, it is
obliged to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.' 6 The Hague Convention is in force and now has over forty
States adhering to it including the United States and Canada.
Finally, on September 23, 1971, a diplomatic conference agreed on
a Convention entitled Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts

11T.I.A.S. 7192 entered into force, October 14, 1971 [hereinafter cited as The Hague
Convention, Art......
].
2 Id. Art. 1.
-3Id. Art. 2.
14 Id. Art. 6, para. 4.
15 Id. Art. 8.
161d. Art. 7.
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Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 17 and the distinction there being
hijacking under the Hague Convention and other acts such as sabotage
under the Montreal Convention as it came to be known. This Convention
defined a number of acts jeopardizing the safety of civil aviation to be an
offense, for example acts of violence against a person on board an aircraft
if it is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft; destruction of an
aircraft in service or damaging an aircraft in such a way as to render it
incapable of flight or to likely endanger its safety in flight; placing on an
aircraft a device or substance which is likely to cause the aforesaid
destruction or damaging; destruction or damaging of air navigation
facilities if likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; and
communicating information known to be false thereby endangering the
safety of an aircraft in flight.' 8 Again, Contracting States are required
to make such offenses punishable by "severe penalties."'19 The application
of the Convention is generally limited to international flights. 20 The
Montreal Convention closely follows the Hague Convention with respect
to the requirements regarding the taking into custody of an offender, the
giving of notice to other interested States and the prosecution of
the offender if the Contracting State does not extradite him. Again, the
a
offense is deemed by the Convention to be an extraditable offense.2
The Montreal Convention also provides however, and this is where
it is quite distinct from the Hague Convention, that Contracting States
shall endeavor to take all practicable measures for the purpose of
preventing the offenses defined in the Convention and any Contracting
State having reason to believe that an offense "will be" committed is
required to furnish any relevant information in its possession to the
Contracting State where it believes the offense is to be committed,
the Contracting State of registration of the aircraft and the Contracting
State where the aircraft may land. 22 To date the Convention has been
ratified or adhered to by ten States but as they were not all signatories
it is not yet in effect. This was, I think, a peculiarity of the Montreal
Convention in that the ten that first adhered to it or ratified it had to be
Signatory States.23 There are other provisions for it coming into force
later on. In my opinion, the provision in the Convention requiring a State
which even has a reason to believe that an offense is to be committed to

International Legal Materials 1151 (1971)
Convention].
17 10

[hereinafter cited as The Montreal

18 Id. Art. 1,para. 1.
19 Id. Art. 3.
2o Id.Art. 4.

21 ld.Art. 8.
22
23

Id. Art. 12.
Id. Art. 15, para. 3.
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furnish information with respect thereto to other Contracting States will
seriously compromise the possibility of wide ratification of this Convention.
Throughout the development of this international law, I think it is
safe to say that the most controversial matter of principle was the
question of extradition. Although the Tokyo Convention provided that
offenses committed on aircraft should be treated for purposes of
extradition as if they had been committed not only in the place where
they occurred, but also in the territory of the State of registration of the
aircraft,24 the Convention stated specifically that nothing in it should be
deemed to create an obligation to grant extradition. 25 Understandably,
States were reluctant to derogate the long-established principle of
international law that extradition requests would not be met when the
State of refuge deemed that the offense alleged was of a political nature.26
It is indicative of the grave concern held by most States with respect to
the threat of hijacking that in both the Hague and Montreal conventions
it is provided that if an extradition request is refused the State is "obliged
without exception whatsoever" to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 27 The Conventions further
require that the authorities shall take their decision with respect to the
prosecution in the same manner as in the case of an ordinary offense of
a serious nature under the law of that State. 28 As the States are obliged
to make hijacking and the other specified unlawful acts punishable by
"severe penalties" this obligation is intended to ensure that even if there
is not extradition the offender will be punished if guilty. (The question
of what is a political offense is quite interesting because it is a very
pregnant aspect of all this international legislation.)
Many extradition treaties also provide for the denial of extradition
if the offense is punishable by death in the State requesting surrender of
the fugitive, when the State in which he is found provides for a lesser
penalty for the same offense. 29 As many States have abolished the death
penalty or do not provide it for hijacking, the death penalty, although
intended to deter hijackings, may in fact result in the frustration of

The Tokyo Convention, Art. 16, para. 1.
Id. Art. 16, para. 2.
2
OSee, e.g., Convention on Extradition Between the United States and Sweden, 18
U.S.T. 1845; T.I.A.S. 5996; 494 U.N.T.S 141; Art. V, para. 5 [hereinafter cited as
Extradition Treaty Between U.S. and Sweden.].
27The Hague Convention, Art. 7; The Montreal Convention, Art. 7.
28 Id.
29
See, e.g., Extradition Treaty Between U.S. and Sweden, Art. VIII.
24

25
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extradition when the hijacking is successful. That comment is directed
actually to your law which I think under your Federal Aviation Act has
a provision in it for the death penalty in the event of air piracy. There is
another very interesting point in the same area. An American psychiatrist,
Dr. David Hubbard, who has been making a very close study of
hijackers, has come to the conclusion that the possibility of being
put to death if they are captured in fact may motivate some of
these unfortunate creatures in that they have subconscious, if not
conscious, suicidal tendencies.
It will be recalled that the Tokyo Convention did not come into
force until six years after it was drafted. Perhaps, however, even more
frustrating than delay in the adoption of these treaties is the failure by
Contracting States to adhere to their provisions. In an effort to forestall
this and in anticipation of the signing of the Hague and Montreal
conventions, Canada and the United States submitted proposals to the
ICAO Assembly in June, 1970. Canada suggested that bilateral Air
Transport Agreements be amended to provide for the suspension of
services to a State that failed to comply with relevant Conventions. 30 The
United Nations proposes a multilateral Convention with the same
objectives. The subsequent machinations of the various formations within
ICAO are too complex to enumerate here. Suffice it to say that as recently
as July, 1971, the ICAO Assembly relegated the subject of compliance to
the non-current part of the work programme of the Legal Committee.
However, under pressure of further outrages and the worldwide strike of
the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Association on June 19,
1972, the Council of ICAO gave the following instructions in a Resolution:
DIRECTS the Legal Committee to convene immediately a special
Subcommittee to work on the preparation of an international
convention to establish appropriate multilateral procedures within the
ICAO framework for determining whether there is a need for joint
action in cases envisaged in the first Resolution adopted by the
Council on 1 October 1970
and for decision on the nature of joint
3
action if it is to be taken. '
The special Legal Sub-Committee met in Washington September
4-15, 1972. Again, there was great divergence of opinion, many delegates
reiterating the argument that no sanctions should be imposed outside the

3oICAO Doc. A17-W.P./49 15/6/70 ICAO Assembly 17th Sess. [extraordinary].
31 ICAO Doc. 9028-C/1008.
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charter of the United Nations. Finally, the Sub-Committee concluded that
its only conclusion was that its inconclusive report should be referred to
the Legal Committee and that the whole subject should be considered by it.
In November, 1972, the Council of ICAO endorsed the recommendation of the Sub-Committee that its report be considered by a Special
Session of the Legal Committee to be convened in January, 1973. The
Council has also directed the secretariat to "provide for" a diplomatic
conference in August. However, in the terminology of the international
bureaucrats this does not mean that such an assembly of plenipotentiaries
will necessarily be convened. In the meantime, every day brings the
inevitable disaster closer.**

** [Ed. note-The report of the Washington Sub-Committee came before the ICAO
Legal Committee in Montreal. Discussion in the Legal Committee resulted in a
recommendation that the following meetings be convened: A session of the ICAO
Assembly to consider two draft amendments to The Convention on Civil Aviation
(Chicago Convention) which had been placed before the Legal Committee; a
diplomatic conference to consider a draft convention on the question of action to be
taken as to defaulting states; and a proposal to supplement the Hague and Montreal
conventions with certain provisions including a provision which contemplates instant
extradition of the alleged offender. In March, 1973, the ICAO Council decided to
convene an extraordinary session of the ICAO Assembly and a diplomatic conference
for the aforementioned purpose. These meetings will be held in Rome beginning on
August 28, 1973.]
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